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In this paper, I explore the connection between Martin Heidegger’s concepts of ‘errancy’ 
and the ‘way.’ This connection provides important clarity to Heidegger’s project, as it helps to 
explain how the ineffable, unfolding ‘way’ could serve as both the possibility for a new way of 
thinking and the withdrawal that gives rise to the very reign of method that covers over this 
possibility. Regarding errancy, this paper distinguishes two senses in which the term is engaged: 
(1) the inescapable openness of Being that allows for untruth, and (2) the tendency of this open 
region to efface and forget the fact of its own openness. Drawing from Heidegger’s discussions 
on the dao, I argue that this twofold errancy is central to Heidegger’s concept of the way. In 
order to clarify this connection, I introduce the term ‘lostness,’ hearkening back loosely to its 
application in Being and Time (1927). In my new application, lostness evokes the impossibility 
of ‘finding’ truth along some ‘right path.’ Any such goal of ‘finding’ the way is emblematic of 
the twofold errancy of contemporary thought because it forgets that no such path could exist 
independently of its middle-voiced arising between the way-making of the human being and the 
way-making of Being itself. As such, lostness points out the errancy in contemporary way-
making, and clarifies the possibility of ‘overcoming’ this metaphysical pattern of thought. In 
short, we must realize the fundamental ‘lostness’ of the way and reevaluate what the process of 
‘finding our way’ would even look like.  
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Questioning builds a way. We would be advised, therefore, above all to pay heed to the 
way and not to fix our attention on isolated sentences and topics. The way is one of 
thinking. All ways of thinking, more or less predictably lead through language in a way 
that is extraordinary. (Heidegger 1977d, 287) 
1) Introduction 
In the following major research paper, I will be questioning the way itself. To take my cue 
from the above quote, it might be said that I will be building a way into the way, at least as 
Heidegger understood it. Perhaps this seems redundant, like building a fire into a fire, but the 
way is unlike any concrete, ontic object in the world. For Heidegger, the way is not a mere path, 
but it is that which gives way, forms a way, keeps a way, brings a way, and, as such, is way-
making in the truest sense (Heidegger 1971b, 130). The words often translated in Heidegger’s 
work as ‘way-making’ are Be-wëgen and Be-wëgung; unusual versions of the German words for 
‘to move’ (bewegen) and ‘movement’ (Bewegung) with hyphens and the trema added. On the 
significance of these changes, Gail Stenstad writes that  
By emphasizing the prefix, Heidegger may be suggesting that we are not to understand 
be-wëgen as a transitive verb in some typical subject-object structure. Way is not some 
object. Way-making makes way in such a way that ‘it is’ the way, that is, all there ‘is’ is 
way-making movement. The movement moves, and that is all. It gives way in self-
withdrawing, in yielding way (qtd. in Lacertosa 2019, 113) 
Heidegger seems to confirm this, describing the related root wëgen from the Alemannic-Swabian 
dialect as “to clear a way, for instance across a snow-covered field,” and describes way-making 
not as moving along a path that is already there, but “to bring the way … forth first of all, and 
thus to be the way” (Heidegger 1971b, 129-30). As such, Heidegger’s ‘way’ represents the 
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unfolding movement of Being itself, and is of critical importance to his overall project. This fact 
was not lost on Heidegger, who featured the word ‘way’ in many of his titles and went so far as 
to describe his collected works as “ways, not works” (qtd. in Davis 2016a, vii). But as we will 
see in the following sections, the term still remains unclear. 
For Heidegger, the current path of human existence is framed on all sides by a technical 
fascination with presence and appearances. As we will see, this limited mode of ‘presencing’ 
obscures the possibility of open comportment and the ‘new way of thinking’ that Heidegger 
points us to. But it will also become apparent that this technical fascination arises out of the very 
movement of way-making, as this movement itself has been shot through by ‘errancy’ (das 
Irren). As such, contemporary human beings find themselves on an errant path, and yet the way-
making movement of the human being (which represents the possibility for a new way of 
thinking) ostensibly underpins all iterations of the way, including the errant ones.  
From this, it may seem that Heidegger has conflicting views on the way, and it may seem 
unclear which aspect of the way he intends to criticize. On the one hand, human beings find 
themselves on a path of thought that obscures the possibility for open comportment and the ‘new 
way’ of thinking. Yet, it will be shown that this errancy is not only inalienable, but even 
necessary for the new way of thought itself. This seeming conflict notably appears in 
Heidegger’s asides to Daoist philosophy. In one such passage, Heidegger calls the way “a great 
hidden stream which moves all things along and makes way for everything. All is way” 
(Heidegger 1971a, 92). But in the same breath, he affirms that this primordial movement of way-
making underpins the very reign of method that we are supposed to overcome by returning to the 
way (Heidegger 1971a, 92). In passages of this sort, it seems that a tension is growing between 
two different senses in which the way is errant. I will argue that Heidegger’s references to Daoist 
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philosophy highlight this twofold sense of errancy and help to locate these senses with relation to 
the ‘way,’ though these implication are not often brought out clearly in the secondary literature. 
In order to resolve the seeming conflict mentioned above, I will further clarify the 
connection between Heidegger’s concepts of ‘errancy’ and the ‘way’ by introducing the bridging 
term ‘lostness.’ This term connects these concepts through its implicit reference to an errant way, 
and its applicability to Heidegger’s work on both concepts. Lostness (Verlorenheit) appears in 
Heidegger’s early work as a description of Dasein’s everyday disclosedness in the ‘They’ 
(Heidegger 1962, 234/BT 189), but the term rings out beyond Being and Time (1927) and should 
be reinterpreted as a hermeneutic tool for his later work as well. This reinterpretation of 
‘lostness’ will clarify the link between Heidegger’s understanding of the way and his multi-
layered understanding of errancy. 
Contrary to the everyday concept of erring, which would emphasize a binary notion of 
untruth or misdirection, Heidegger’s use of errancy does not refer to a propositional state of 
untruth, or a state of being-misled. Rather, errancy takes on two senses in Heidegger’s work. I 
will call these: (1) the ontological sense of errancy, understood as the inescapable openness of 
Being that allows for untruth, and (2) the historical sense of errancy, understood as the tendency 
of this open region to efface and forget the fact of its own openness. By passing over the manner 
in which this openness arises, this second sense of errancy has given rise to a mode of revealing 
that Heidegger sometimes calls ‘technology.’ The first of these senses of erring is ineradicable, 
but the second, for Heidegger, is the historical product of our philosophical thought and ways of 
being and could be overcome by cultivating a new way of thinking. This notion that the 
historical errancy of modern technology can be ‘overcome’ is complicated by the ontological 
sense of errancy, which remains ineradicable. As we will see, technology is not errant in the 
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sense that it differs from some alternate correct path we could independently discern and choose. 
Rather, technology dominates contemporary thought because it effaces the manner of its own 
arising. It understands the unfolding way as something that humans send themselves on, but in 
doing so it has missed the equal contribution made by Being itself in the unfolding of the way. In 
other words, in contemporary thought, we forget that the way arises in the interchange between 
the way-making of the human being and the way-making of Being itself. For Heidegger, 
overcoming our historical errancy involves cultivating a state of ‘releasement’ in which we listen 
and respond to the way-making of Being, therein opening ourselves to the genuine possibility of 
finding a way into truth. 
Here, we will see the applicability of ‘lostness’ as the connection between Heidegger’s 
conception of errancy and the way. We are called to realize the error in contemporary thought, 
insofar as it passes over its own historical contingency, but because the way itself is errant at the 
ontological level, there is no independently existing ‘right path’ that we can turn towards. In this 
sense, we are fundamentally lost. Furthermore, it is by properly realizing this state that we can 
move beyond the historically contingent errancy in our way of thinking. Instead of calling for us 
to find a new way, Heidegger’s project calls us to reevaluate how ways arise. It calls us to realize 
that ways do not merely arise because we define them and send ourselves on them. Instead, it is 
only through realizing the historical contingency and limited perspective of our contemporary 
mode of revealing that we can cultivate a reciprocal openness to Being that is not errant in the 
historical sense. This is only possible if we understand the manner in which the way is errant and 
release ourselves into a state in which we can listen and respond to the way-making of Being. In 
other words, it is only possible if we see our human condition as one in which we are lost, and 
redefine what the active process of ‘finding our way’ would even look like. 
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In this way, the term ‘lostness’ will clarify the interplay between errancy and the way in 
Heidegger’s project, and will show how the way could unfold as both the primordial possibility 
for a new way of thinking, and the withdrawing openness that gives rise to the very reign of 
method that covers over this possibility. In the end, this paper will close by considering a 
possible implication that this content will have on Heidegger’s problem of ‘overcoming’ 
philosophy. I will attempt to briefly add to a debate on this topic by utilizing the concept of 
lostness in the way to clarify the problem of overcoming metaphysics. 
2) Lostness in Being and Time 
Although I intend to apply the concept of ‘lostness’ to Heidegger’s later work, the term 
appears most distinctly in Being and Time (1927). Here, lostness is used as a description of 
Dasein’s everyday disclosedness in the ‘They’ (Heidegger 1962, 234/BT 189). I claim that this 
definition of lostness has notable parallels to themes in Heidegger’s later work and is emblematic 
of a central movement in Heidegger’s thought. To understand this, we must briefly explore 
Heidegger’s early conception of the human being, and the way in which lostness is inalienable to 
its existence. 
In some sense, the notion of lostness permeates Heidegger’s early conception of the human 
being right from the beginning. When we first encounter the contemporary human being in 
Heidegger’s work, we do not encounter it as an ontic, biological arrangement of parts, but as that 
entity which has forgotten the question of the meaning of Being (Heidegger 1962, 21, 59/BT 2, 
35). Furthermore, it is quickly argued that the ‘average’ or ‘everyday’ understanding of Being 
that is perpetuating this forgetfulness is part of our essential constitution (Heidegger 1962, 38/BT 
16-7). In other words, forgetting this question is not like forgetting your keys on the kitchen 
table, or forgetting how to multiply numbers. This vital question was lost due to the very nature 
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of the opening onto the world that the human being represents. This is how Heidegger would like 
to understand an existing human – an opening, or an unfolding encounter, stretched out 
spatiotemporally within a world. As such, Heidegger names the individual that constitutes this 
opening ‘Dasein’, or ‘being-there.’ The majority of Heidegger’s early work focusses on 
interrogating Dasein because its essential constitution carries an ontico-ontological priority in 
any investigation of Being (Heidegger 1962 34/BT 13). This is largely due to the fact that 
Dasein’s Being can be individuated in a more distinct way than other beings. Dasein is the being 
for which its own Being-in-the-world is an issue (Heidegger 1962, 182/BT 143). An ontological 
epoché focusing on such an entity will expose the structure of Being in newfound clarity, and 
allow the phenomenologist to resist the focus on theoretical detachment that has passed over the 
question of the meaning of Being since Plato. In other words, Dasein has the ability to arrive at 
the question of the meaning of Being through a careful examination of its own existence. 
Furthermore, the reason that philosophical reflection has historically passed over this ‘ownmost’ 
potentiality-for-Being is actually revelatory of Dasein’s everyday state, or its everyday mode of 
‘disclosedness.’ 
Throughout our lives, authentic ontological questions are passed over because the world is 
primarily disclosed to us in a mode of ‘average everydayness.’ In this mode, Dasein passes over 
its own Being, and deflects any authentic concerns about its existence aside. In the place of these 
concerns, Dasein rests in the familiarity of the seemingly concrete, ontic world that it shares with 
others (Heidegger 1962, 165/BT 127). It does this because everyday Dasein flees from what 
Heidegger calls ‘nullity’ (Heidegger 1962, 223/BT 178). If we really consider our own existence, 
we find it is fundamentally delimited by the nothingness of finite limits – our birth, and our 
death. Consideration of this finitude produces a feeling of anxiety, but it also individuates Dasein 
9 
 
in its Being (Heidegger 1962, 232/BT 187-8). This is why Dasein has priority in Heidegger’s 
project, but it is also the reason why Dasein naturally turns away from authentic ontological 
questions. Rather than resolutely face up to our ownmost possibility (death), we turn inwards, 
and are ‘absorbed’, ‘entangled, and ‘fascinated’ by entities within-the-world (Heidegger 1962, 
107, 223/BT 76, 178). One way that Heidegger describes this state is ‘lostness.’  
Lostness, in early Heidegger, is the tranquilization of Dasein as a mere entity among others 
(Heidegger 1962, 234/BT 189). Often, this existential mode is referred to as ‘publicness’ and is 
articulated around an amorphous social spectre called ‘the They’ (Heidegger 1962, 234/BT 189). 
Importantly, the They is an existentiale – an essential structure of Dasein – and cannot be excised 
from our being (Heidegger 1962, 167/BT 129). Being authentic Dasein does not mean 
disavowing oneself of the They, but simply gathering oneself from dispersion into the They, and 
realizing one’s actual potentialities for Being. To put this in simpler terms, in everyday life we 
will almost always sluff off any authentic concerns about Being because such concerns carry an 
inherent reference to the finitude of our own existence. The uncanny realization of our mortality 
and our existential angst are passed over for a general ambivalence that we cultivate in several 
ways. Either we ‘absorb’ ourselves into the ontic world of objects, or we ‘lose’ ourselves in the 
idle talk and support of our neighbours and friends. But in doing so, we fail to realize that death 
is existentially isolated to the dying individual. It is our ‘own’ in a way that other concerns are 
not. For Heidegger, death cannot merely be a state of non-being that we have not yet 
encountered. If this were the case, then perhaps we could take an Epicurean view on death; 
perhaps death “is nothing to us, since so long as we exist, death is not with us; but when death 
comes, then we do not exist” (Epicurus 1940, 31). If this were the case, then death should no 
longer be of any concern to the existing human being, and any such concern would be 
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foolishness. But for Heidegger, death has real significance for us. We carry it with us. It 
represents an existential possibility in our current lives; the possibility to grasp our life’s 
potentialities as our ‘own’ and no one else’s. This is made possible by death because, for 
Heidegger, death is the lived finitude of our existence (Heidegger 1962, 378/BT 329). If Dasein 
realizes this finitude, it finds itself in a state of anxiety and is ‘thrown back’ onto the possibilities 
of its life. These possibilities are realized as its own possibilities, and Dasein is therein 
individualized. As such, any authentic appreciation of Being must necessarily gain its footing by 
overcoming the “downward plunge” away from such an authentic encounter with our ownmost 
possibility and into lostness (Heidegger 1962, 223/BT 178).  
This concept of ‘plunging’ or ‘falling,’ is important to note because it highlights an aspect of 
lostness vital to its reuptake in Heidegger’s later work. Specifically, falling reveals the core of 
‘movement’ in Heidegger’s conception of everyday disclosedness. Authentic Dasein is 
spatiotemporally fluid, and its movement through the world escapes all attempts to concretize 
itself into any objectivist matrix. Furthermore, Heidegger argues that the very tranquilizing 
forces that we are called to overcome are inalienable modes of our Being. The possibilities of 
our Being are inevitably handed over to us by the They, and as such, lostness represents a 
“positive possibility” that cannot be left behind by more advanced thinkers (Heidegger 1962, 
167, 220/BT 129, 176). This complicates the whole notion of overcoming our everyday 
disclosedness, and places lostness at the uncanny core of human existence.  
I claim that these themes are picked up again in Heidegger’s later concept of errancy.  
Section 3) Errancy 
As Heidegger developed his thought after Being and Time (1927), he moved away from 
Dasein as the starting point of the investigation. Rather than examining entities and anxiety as 
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personal aspects of Dasein’s understanding, Heidegger broadens his view to see human existence 
arising within an enveloping ‘openness’ or ‘region’ which is irreducible to its human dimension 
(Zimmerman 1993, 247). With this, the previously individualized battle against inauthenticity 
becomes a broader problem that is historically rooted in systems of thought and the unfolding of 
the world itself (Zimmerman 1993, 247-8). As such, the forgetting of Being no longer primarily 
reflects Dasein’s existential condition, but the condition of the open region itself – the space of 
clearing in which beings might be seen in their unconcealment. However, like the challenge that 
lostness presented to authenticity, Heidegger emphasizes that the unconcealment of beings is 
suffused with a prevailing concealment. This is where the term ‘errancy’ comes into play. 
In his address “On the Essence of Truth” (1930), Heidegger describes this interplay between 
unconcealing and concealing as a tension between truth and untruth. A connection is drawn 
between truth and unconcealment through the Ancient Greek term alētheia. Contrary to the 
Aristotelian and Kantian understandings of truth – which Heidegger takes to represent a mere 
accordance between objects and the subjective intellect (Heidegger 1977b, 122) – alētheia points 
to the freedom (or opening up) of the open region in which beings arise (or are ‘lighted’). As a 
result, truth for the human being becomes a kind of ‘letting-be’ of this open region. This 
comportment towards beings may sound passive, but it should be seen as an active engagement 
of ‘sheltering’ Being. As Heidegger puts it, “To engage oneself in the disclosedness of beings is 
not to lose oneself in them; rather, such engagement withdraws in the face of beings in order that 
they may reveal themselves with respect to what and how they are and in order that presentative 
correspondence might take its standard from them” (Heidegger 1977b, 128). Here, we see again 
the emphasis on not losing oneself in the ontic world of being, and we get the sense that the 
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movement of withdrawal is making a positive contribution in the lighting of beings. But these 
themes of loss and discovery remain intertwined and bear further examination. 
Untruth is the result of the aforementioned loss, and is understood as errancy (das Irren), or 
the failure to shelter being in the open-region. As Heidegger puts it a little later in the same 
essay, our “flight from the mystery toward what is readily available, onward from one current 
thing to the next, passing the mystery by – this is erring” (Heidegger 1977b, 135). Here, we may 
be reminded of lostness, insofar as errancy involves being driven from the ‘mystery’ of Being in 
favour of our everyday concernful dealings within the world. By ‘mystery,’ Heidegger is 
referring to the fact that Being itself plays a central role in the unfolding of the world, equal to 
the contribution of the human being. We get a clear sense in this passage that errancy represents 
a kind of ‘passing over’ of the proper focus of our inquiry. This is what I referred to earlier as the 
historical sense of errancy, or the tendency of errancy to efface itself. In the broader context of 
this passage, Heidegger reveals that this concealing movement away from truth actually 
represents an open region of its own, but one that forgets and passes over the mystery of Being 
(Heidegger 1977b, 136). In its propensity for obscuring the possibility of the unconcealment of 
Being, errancy underpins an openness towards being misled. Robert Mugerauer connects this to 
Heidegger’s earlier preoccupation with resolutely facing up to the uncanny grounds of our 
existence. In errancy, we do not find falsity in the typical sense, but we actually encounter the 
familiar attunement toward Being that we engage in every day. As he puts it, untruth represents a 
flight from what shows itself to us in anxiety; a turning “back toward what is everyday and 
comfortably normal” and “away from what comes toward us” (Mugerauer 2008, 57).   
It is worth noting that the push away from individuated interpretations in Heidegger’s work 
means that errancy is not just a facet of Dasein’s propensity to err, but stands as an ontological 
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feature of the region itself. George Pattison’s Guidebook to the Later Heidegger (2000) reflects 
this, viewing errancy as the wandering of Being at the level of society. Pattison argues that 
errancy is the reason why different cultures in different epochs have wandered in different 
directions linguistically and in terms of thought (Pattison 2000, 70). This broader applicability of 
errancy is important for the project at hand, as I will be locating errancy in the concept of the 
way, which encompasses both the unfolding way of individual Dasein and the movement of 
Being itself. 
4) Errancy as the ‘Wrong Way’ 
Now, following the implications of the term ‘erring,’ it might be tempting to say that errancy 
should be understood as ‘moving along the wrong way’ or the ‘wrong path.’ On a limited 
reading of the historical sense of errancy, this is true, but this application would only present a 
one-dimensional view of errancy. This link to way is supported etymologically but will later be 
shown to pass over a more primordial reading of the way, and an ontological dimension of the 
term errancy.  
To err [irren], in Heidegger’s sense, is derived from the Latin errare which means “to 
wander from the right way” (Heidegger 1977b, 135). In Heidegger’s later work, this errant path 
is broadly addressed as a problem of technological thinking; a thinking which makes nature 
manifest, or ‘wills a ground’ in order to categorize and objectify the horizons of its inquiry. As 
we have already seen, Heidegger often extols an attitude of attentive letting-be toward the arising 
of things. One essential aspect of this process is that of bringing-forth, or poiēsis. For Heidegger, 
poiēsis represents the creative potential of letting what is not yet present arise out of itself 
(Heidegger 1977d, 293). One specific type of poiēsis is technē, or the bringing-forth of beings 
into the unconcealedness of appearances (Heidegger 1977d, 294; Heidegger 1975d, 59). Technē 
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represents the possibility for knowing something as present, which is obviously an essential kind 
of knowledge, but this bringing-forth is so dominant in contemporary society that it actually 
obscures the possibility of poiēsis. This runaway mode of bringing-forth is referred to as 
technology.  
Modern technology, in Heidegger’s work, should not be read as an ontic product of 
technical innovation (for ex. a cell phone, hand tool, or skyscraper). Rather, it is a mode of 
revealing, but not one of poiēsis. Instead, technology is a revealing that ‘sets upon’ being and 
‘challenges’ it into a ‘standing reserve’ (Heidegger 1977d, 296, 298). What this means is that 
technology is the revealing of the world in its concrete utility. But technology is not simply a 
mode of instrumental facilitation, because for Heidegger, it has gained ontological priority over 
every form of thinking (Jung 1987, 235).  
For an extreme example of this mode, we might imagine a modern businessperson, traipsing 
through the forest and seeing only wood resources, raw materials, and potential vacation 
destinations. They manage to bring-forth the beings around them, but they pass over a multi-
layered interpretation of their being because their view is delimited primarily by utility. 
Heidegger would like to say that we are all like this businessperson insofar as we rely on a mode 
of revealing that frames the world around objective forms.  
As you can see, there is a metaphysical layer to this criticism as well. Heidegger often 
attributes the root of modern technology’s dominion over contemporary thought to the Platonic 
project of metaphysics. In this still-dominant project, metaphysics thinks beings ‘as a whole’, or 
as grounded in light of their presence and availability for objective examination. As he puts it, 
“metaphysical thinking, starting from what is present, represents it in its presence and thus 
exhibits it as grounded by its ground.” (Heidegger 1977c, 374). Heidegger defines the current 
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dominance of metaphysical thinking as the destining of ‘Ge-stell’, which is modern technology’s 
“explicit key expression” (Heidegger 1975d, 84). ‘Destining’ is used here to highlight the way in 
which Heidegger believes that the formal concretion of the world ‘sends us upon a way’ 
(Heidegger 1977d, 305). This is a “supreme danger” for Heidegger, because it has alienated 
contemporary people from the authentic possibility to encounter themselves in their essence, and 
from the possibility of listening openly to Being by letting it be (Heidegger 1977d, 308-9). As he 
puts it,  
the challenging-enframing not only conceals a former way of revealing, bringing-forth, 
but it conceals revealing itself and with it that wherein unconcealment, i.e., truth, comes 
to pass. … The rule of enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be 
denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of 
a more primal truth (Heidegger 1977d, 309). 
This priority has not only corrupted the contemporary human encounter with the world, but has 
also misdirected the project of metaphysical philosophy, itself. As he puts it, in today’s world, 
“Philosophy turns into the empirical science of man, of all of what can become for man the 
experiential object of his technology” (Heidegger 1977c, 376). Furthermore, there are real 
implications to the dominance of technology, including what is often called the “devastation of 
the earth and the annihilation of the human essence” (Ma and van Brakel 2014, 529). This could 
be taken in the ontological sense of perceiving beings while overlooking Being itself, or it could 
be taken in a literal sense of the devastation of the earth that humans are likely to perpetuate 
when they encounter it in this way. This double-sense of the annihilation of technology is 
explored in Country Path Conversations (1944-5) where Heidegger acknowledges both the ontic 
tragedy of the forgetting of Being, and foregrounds the primary impact it has on ‘the human’ in 
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its essence (Heidegger 2016, 13/G 20). In his time, the ontic component would have been 
especially relevant to the devastation wrought on Europe during the heavily-industrial World 
Wars, while today it remains applicable to our ongoing industrial activities and environmental 
crisis. For example, our inability to authentically hear the ‘call’ of Being due to the dominion of 
technology leaves us in positions like the one mentioned above, where a forest appears as raw 
materials, rather than a ‘wilderness’ in all its manifold significations (Taylor 2007, 452-3). 
5) The Necessity of Errancy 
Despite the fact that technology and the “path of metaphysics” (Heidegger 1977b, 140) seem 
to articulate Heidegger’s ‘wrong way’ of errancy, this is only true in a limited sense. On a deeper 
reading, there are indications that Heidegger’s full conception of errancy is much more complex. 
For instance, Heidegger also tacitly mentions that errancy is not “like a ditch into which [the 
human being] occasionally stumbles; rather errancy belongs to the inner constitution of the Da-
sein into which historical man is admitted” (Heidegger 1977b, 135-6). So, the historical path of 
modern technology cannot be the entirety of errancy. This is a crucial point when understanding 
Heidegger’s conception of errancy. Due to its connection to untruth, we might assume that 
errancy is something to be overcome through the development of philosophy and thought – like a 
path that we can leave behind – but to interpret it this way would be to pass over the more 
nuanced twofold understanding of errancy that Heidegger seems to promote. Just in the same 
way that lostness was found to contribute to the positive constitution of Dasein and could not be 
thrown off by more advanced thinkers, errancy is affirmed to be an inalienable aspect of Being, 
and co-constitutive of disclosure in general. 
For Heidegger, errancy is both misleading and productive because “as leading astray, 
errancy at the same time contributes to a possibility that man is capable of drawing up from his 
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ek-sistence – the possibility that, by experiencing errancy itself and by not mistaking the mystery 
of Da-sein, he not let himself be led astray” (Heidegger 1977b, 136). By ‘ek-sistence,’ Heidegger 
simply means the spatiotemporally spread-out nature of human existence. This line of thought is 
supported by other interpreters as well, such as Pattison, who claims that “The errancy of 
modernity is not the fault of this or that error in philosophy, still less is it an accidental by-
product of industrialisation, for it is a destining that comes from Being itself” (Pattison 2000, 
180). In other words, we cannot take a merely pejorative view and say that errancy is a ‘wrong’ 
path because it conceals being in untruth, or because it underpins modern technology. In reality, 
both of these are products of errancy as co-constitutive of the openness of Being itself, which 
should always be kept in the foreground as we investigate technology. The human failure to 
realize and appreciate this openness underpins our inability to hear the call of Being, and the 
annihilation along the errant paths that result. In other words, we could say that the misstep of 
contemporary philosophy begins with the prioritization of things like light and objectivity, 
whereas Heidegger wants the reader to see darkness and concealment as equally co-constitutive 
of the arising of Being (Burik 2019, 353-4). In this way, errancy comprises both a necessary 
ontological status, and the expression of this along the errant paths that arise. In other words, 
errancy reflects two things in Heidegger’s work – first, the inalienable openness of Being that 
allows for untruth, and second, the tendency of this region of untruth to efface its own 
concealment in our historically-motivated movement along various untrue paths.  
Pattison and Mugerauer indicate the first of these senses by foregrounding the term 
‘homelessness’ in their discussions. In some sense, homelessness brings out the ontological 
priority in the problem of modern enframing. As Mugerauer points out,  
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If we attempt to stay on the right way, for example in looking for the truth about 
homelessness, being, nothing, and humans, we have to allow the unheimlich to stay 
before us. To stay within the uncanny, where we experience not being at home means to 
refuse refuge in comfortable ways of living and thinking, in comfortable realms which 
might contain us, or in comfortable goals and homes. But this … means that to think 
and question is to hold ourselves in not being at home. The more fully we exercise our 
human capacities the more radically we have to endure homelessness. (Mugerauer 
2008, 58-9) 
I certainly agree that Dasein’s homelessness, or uncanniness (Unheimlichkeit), is related to the 
errancy of the unfolding way of Being. Uncanniness clearly embodies the first sense of errancy 
that I described above. In Being and Time (1927), ‘not-being-at-home’ is the existential mode of 
Dasein when anxiety brings it out of publicness and tranquilization (Heidegger 1962, 233/BT 
188-9). In this mode, the familiarity of everyday Being-in-the-world collapses, and Dasein is 
individualized (Heidegger 1962, 233/BT 189). From this description, it may seem that 
homelessness is opposed to lostness, in which Dasein falls into the familiarity of the world in a 
mode of ‘being-at-home’ (Heidegger 1962, 233/BT 188). But Heidegger also says that an ontico-
ontological interpretation of anxiety will see its uncanniness as always present in Dasein’s 
everyday mode of being (Heidegger 1962, 234/BT 190). Both homelessness and lostness belong 
to Dasein’s essential state of Being-in-the-world, in which homelessness represents a ‘fear’ that 
Dasein ‘dims down’ in its lostness (Heidegger 1962, 234/BT 190). From this, I would argue that 
homelessness is emblematic of the ontological sense of errancy that I identified, while lostness is 
more emblematic of the historical sense. Homelessness hearkens back to the inalienable 
groundlessness of Being that Dasein runs up against in anxiety, while lostness hearkens back to 
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the tendency of our everyday Being-in-the-world to conceal this anxiety. It could even be argued 
that I should take homelessness as my guiding term in this investigation because it represents a 
more primordial phenomenon in Heidegger’s work (Heidegger 1962, 234/BT 190). However, in 
this paper, ‘lostness’ will come to stand as the placeholder for a broader application of errancy to 
Heidegger’s later work due to its implicit connection to a ‘way,’ but this should not indicate that 
I have dismissed the uncanny homelessness of the way in favour of its lostness. The twofold 
conception of errancy that I am describing is one in which Unheimlichkeit and Verlorenheit are 
both captured by an inalienable and self-effacing openness of Being.  
With regard to the inalienability of errancy, we see clear evidence of this in Heidegger’s 
work. Both errancy and even technology are often characterized as inalienable ways of 
revealing, or modes of alētheia (unconcealment) (Heidegger 1977b, 132; Heidegger 1977d, 302). 
It might seem especially strange to consider technology, which is mainly credited with 
concealing Being from our purview, as an inescapable mode of revealing, especially considering 
Heidegger’s goal of overcoming this concealment. However, to interpret concealment as 
something problematic would be to misunderstand it. Errancy, untruth, and technology each have 
tendencies to obscure, but each of their concealments is carried out through a movement of 
revealing. One example of this seeming contradiction is embodied in the term alētheia, which 
not only refers to the lighting and revealing nature of technology, but evokes its inherent 
tendency for concealing as well (Ma 2006, 155).  
Concealment and unconcealment go hand in hand for Heidegger. Whether he is concerned 
with human perception, or the Being of beings itself, all things arise only out of an unarticulated 
background that remains in darkness. This concealment is integral to the unconcealment of 
things (Heidegger 2016, 51/G 81). One of Heidegger’s favourite analogies for this point is that of 
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a star. A star in the night sky is ostensibly a point of light, but it is only visible out of a 
surrounding area of darkness (Burik 2017, 32). Given Heidegger’s interest in mapping this 
paradigm onto truth and untruth, we can begin to understand his similar claim that untruth is 
essential to the arising of truth (Heidegger 1977b, 132). In this sense, the human being is equally 
in truth and untruth, where concealing and revealing are equal aspects of the same process and 
must both respond to the call of Being in order for truth to appear. In this sense, the human being 
is “always astray in errancy” (Heidegger 1977b, 135). This clarifies where the danger lies in the 
errant way of thinking. On the one hand, we have a tendency to overshadow a more primary 
ontological understanding of Being, and to allow metaphysics to present itself as the only mode 
of revealing (Heidegger 1977d, 294, 316). On the other hand, we have an inalienable tendency 
towards an open region of untruth, whether it directs us to the former mode of revealing and 
obscures itself or not. The latter sense (ontological errancy) is only made a problem by the 
former (historical errancy), but both are important to consider when understanding the term. 
However, this notion of errancy as the productive force underpinning the reign of 
metaphysics and technology is drawn outside of the limited domain of Dasein quite clearly in 
Heidegger’s references to Daoism. In one such aside, Heidegger argued that “Perhaps the 
enigmatic power of today’s reign of method also, and indeed preeminently, stems from the fact 
that the methods, notwithstanding their efficiency, are after all merely the runoff of a great 
hidden stream which moves all things along and makes way for everything. All is way.” 
(Heidegger 1971a, 92). It seems clear in this passage that Heidegger considers the movement of 
way a source for the errant movement of human existence. I will now investigate these notes on 
way and dao in order to bring about a clearer understanding of errancy in Heidegger’s concept of 
the way.  
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6) The Separation of Errancy in the Dao 
The word dao is of fundamental importance in Chinese philosophy, referring to a myriad of 
processual forms and activities, such as ‘way,’ ‘road,’ ‘walk,’ and ‘speak’ (Xu 2010, 42). When 
Heidegger addresses this term, he refers to it as the “key word” in Laozi’s “poetic thinking” 
(Heidegger 1971a, 92). This is high praise, as for Heidegger, the figure of the poet represents the 
promise of a new way of thought. The poet is the one able to shape the realm currently defined 
by the metaphysical lightening of Being in order to “come to learn what is unspoken” (Heidegger 
1975f, 96). As we have already seen, this mysterious unconcealment is supposed to arise from 
cultivating an attitude of letting-be and opening ourselves to hear the call of Being. To say that 
Laozi has genuinely articulated himself in poetic thinking is no small claim, nor is the claim that 
the word ‘way’ or dao harbours this unspoken message.  
This is, of course, complicated by the fact that even Daoists do not think that the word dao is 
exactly correspondent to the unfolding harmony of Being that it represents. In the very first verse 
of the Daodejing, Laozi claims that the true dao is unnamable. From a perspective rooted in 
western metaphysics, it may be tempting to read this as referring to a transcendental dao, 
operating like some ontotheological principle that cannot be fully realized because of its distance 
from the ontic world. However, some scholarship has pointed out that a more accurate 
interpretation of the dao’s ineffability would simply be to view it as an expansive, diffuse term 
that applies to the totality of harmonious transformation in the world, and as such cannot be 
pinned down (Burik 2010, 509). It seems that Heidegger’s model of the way corresponds to the 
Daoist picture in this respect. Brett Davis makes this argument, claiming that “For both 
Heidegger and the Daodejing, [the] Way is not a transcendent being that lords its Will over us, 
but rather a natural self-unfolding or “enregioning” of a surrounding ‘open-region; (Gegnet) that 
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lets us be as we release ourselves unto its middle-voiced occurrence” (Davis 2020, 167). The 
term ‘Gegnet’, here, refers to the openness of Being itself, or the “unlimited open-region that 
encompasses the delimited openness of human horizons” (Davis 2019, 14). Within this openness, 
we must listen to the call of being in a mode of releasement that lies outside the distinction 
between activity and passivity. It is a ‘middle-voiced’ response because the way that results is 
neither the product of human willing, nor solely a product of Being itself. Instead, Heidegger’s 
way arises in the middle, between Being’s way-making and our response. Because of the 
emphasis on letting-be and waiting for Being in this process, it could be said that Heidegger calls 
us to ‘will’ a state of ‘non-willing’ (Heidegger 2016 92/G 142). As we will see later, it is hotly 
debated how we are supposed to understand this willing of non-willing, but at least it seems that 
Heidegger has taken the Daoist view that the way carries a certain ineffability insofar as it 
represents the enveloping movement of all Being. 
Whatever the case may be with his view on the transcendence of the way, Heidegger is very 
clear that the common definition of ‘way’ remains emblematic of the technological fascination 
with presence and appearances; a way typically represents only an ontic space between two 
points (Heidegger 1971a, 92). This is almost certainly true as regards the contemporary usage of 
the term, so the first purpose that ‘dao’ serves is to understand the way as the arising movement 
of Being itself. As Heidegger puts it, 
Tao could be the way that gives all ways, the very source of our power to think what 
reason, mind, meaning, logos properly mean to say – properly, by their proper nature. 
Perhaps the mystery of mysteries of thoughtful Saying conceals itself in the word ‘way,’ 
Tao, if only we will let these names return to what they leave unspoken, if only we are 
capable of this, to allow them to do so. Perhaps the enigmatic power of today’s reign of 
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method also, and indeed preeminently, stems from the fact that the methods, 
notwithstanding their efficiency, are after all merely the runoff of a great hidden stream 
which moves all things along and makes way for everything. All is way. (Heidegger 
1971a, 92) 
The significance of this attempt to clarify ‘way’ cannot be overstated. As we saw earlier, the 
concept of ‘way’ is of fundamental importance to Heidegger. But this passage does much more 
than enshrine ‘way’ as a central leitmotif in Heidegger’s work. By engaging with Daoist sources, 
Heidegger is attempting to clarify the source of conflict that he has diagnosed in contemporary 
Western thought. As he points out, the reign of method arises from the same ‘great hidden 
stream’ of Being that gives rise to unconcealment, truth, and the possibility of overcoming this 
metaphysical reign itself. If we consider this in conjunction with my earlier descriptions of the 
technical-metaphysical history of thought, it seems that when Heidegger attributes the ‘reign of 
method’ to the overflowing source of the way, he is placing errancy at the heart of this Daoist 
sense of ‘way.’ As we have seen, the open region of errancy gives rise to modern technology in a 
twofold manner. In one sense, it provides an inalienable openness of Being that allows for 
untruth, but in a second sense, it represents the tendency of this openness to efface its own 
concealment, the prominence of which has given rise to the ‘reign of method’ Heidegger 
mentions in the passage discussed above. As such, we should consider the above quote to be an 
indication that errancy is not only fundamental to the human being and our comportment towards 
the world, but also to Being itself. 
There are also other signs that this is the picture of ‘way’ that Heidegger is drawing up in 
correspondence with the dao. This way is said to belong to a ‘neighbourhood’ in which poetic 
saying and thinking are brought together (Heidegger 1971a, 93). But the way is brought about by 
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a movement of ‘waiting’ in which we cultivate an open receptivity to the world, and let Being 
and language speak to us, from themselves (Heidegger 1971a, 85). As we have seen, cultivating 
the correct attitude of letting-be in the open region requires an equal receptivity to both 
unconcealment and concealment. This is made emblematic with regard to the ‘way’ as dao in 
Country Path Conversations (1944-5).  
In this text, three conversations are written out as scripts between archetypal characters who 
represent different philosophical stances on the question of Being. In the first conversation, there 
are notable exchanges in which Heidegger’s scientist-character expresses a feeling of unease and 
emptiness as the conversation moves into the darkness of night, and away from the realm of 
metaphysically grounded sciences (Heidegger 2016, 86/G 133). In response, Heidegger’s guide-
character extols the virtue of emptiness in gathering being together. He uses the metaphor of a 
jug, which is only able to perform the gathering involved in the event of drinking by abiding in 
the emptiness of the jug (Heidegger 2016, 87-8/G 135). This theme is brought out further in “The 
Thing” (Heidegger 1975e, 169) and has often been attributed comparatively to Daodejing 
chapter 11 (Nelson 2014, 316; Parkes 2012, 126; Pöggeler 1987, 61). In this chapter, Laozi 
describes a cup, a wheel, and a room, but prioritizes the empty space within these as providing 
their existence. He closes the chapter by saying “only when [a thing] has wu, does it have life” 
(wu here being the emptiness mentioned above) (Laozi 2001, 24). Country Path Conversations 
(1944-5) also contains a more explicit reference to Daoist literature at the end of the third 
conversation. Here, chapter 26 of the Zhuangzi is quoted at length: 
The one said: ‘You are talking about the unnecessary.’ 
The other said: ‘A person must first have recognized the unnecessary before one can 
talk with him about the necessary. The earth is wide and large, and yet, in order to 
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stand, the human needs only enough space to be able to put his foot down. But what if 
directly next to his foot a crevice were to open up that dropped down to the underworld, 
then would the space where he stands still be of use to him?’ 
The one said: ‘It would be of no more use to him’ 
The other said: ‘From this the necessity of the unnecessary is clearly apparent.’ (qtd. in 
Heidegger 2016, 156/G 239) 
This comes at the end of a long conversation in a prisoner of war camp in which the devastation 
of industrial warfare is attributed to the failure of human beings to cultivate an attitude of waiting 
and letting-be, in contrast to the attitude of ordering and dominating nature (Heidegger 2016, 
148-9/G 228-9). Here again, the unnecessary represents the unarticulated background out of 
which a primordial unconcealment would be possible.  
This fascination with Daoism as the harbinger of this new type of releasement was even 
evident in Heidegger’s personal life. In one notable story, Heidegger had his student Paul Shih-yi 
Hsiao write a passage from Daodejing chapter 15 in calligraphy, and then proceeded to hang it in 
his office. This passage was translated to Heidegger as “Who can, settling the muddy, gradually 
make it clear? Who can, stirring the tranquil, gradually bring it to life?” (Hsiao 1987, 100). 
Heidegger’s interpretation of this highlighted the power of the tranquil in bringing something 
into being (Hsiao 1987, 100). Here, we see again the idea that letting-be and listening openly to 
Being is essential to the arising of the world itself. 
Whether Daoism was his inspiration for this focus on nothingness, or just helped to clarify 
his ideas on this topic, it seems that Heidegger drew upon Daoism in order to articulate the 
central place that nothingness has in his project. It is no longer merely the nullity of Dasein’s 
own existence which must be faced resolutely. Now the uncanny root of our existence is the 
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product of the revealing/concealing movement of Being itself. In other words, there is an 
essential tendency in Being to withdraw, which must not be passed over as we attempt to 
understand it. In this sense, these passages serve to clarify how such concealing could be 
considered a co-constitutive aspect of the unfolding of Being in alethic unconcealment. In other 
words, these passages place errancy at the heart of the withdrawing movement of the way, and 
justify its positive interpretation.  
Scholarship on Heidegger and Daoism has certainly picked up on this aspect of 
revealing/concealing, as well as Heidegger’s related interest in releasement and letting-be (Davis 
2020, 167), but the clarifications I noted regarding errancy and the way are often passed over. 
Instead, related resonances between Heideggerian and Daoist philosophy are usually noted, such 
as the fact that Heidegger saw in Daoism something akin to his own polemic against logocentric 
metaphysics. Steven Burik comes closer to my project when he mentions the fact that Daoism 
allowed Heidegger to clarify the aspect of becoming in which nothing and being must be 
considered together as mutual parts of a processual, unfolding world (Burik 2016, 24). Burik 
says that Daoism gave Heidegger a means to rethink ontological presence, and to accommodate 
an equality between being and non-being (Burik 2016, 24). We saw this earlier with Heidegger’s 
mutual co-dependence of unconcealment and concealment. Developing a processual ontology 
supports these arguments because elements of Being can no longer be set in objective opposition 
to one another. Being and nothingness become a developing flow of becoming and passing away. 
Presence and absence form a cycle like growth and decay, or like the ever-adaptable Daoist 
binary of yin and yang (Burik 2019, 365). Furthermore, it helps to clarify the divide between 
contemporary metaphysics and ancient Chinese philosophy that Heidegger is picking up on. Put 
simply, contemporary thought focusses on logos, or a metaphysical principle that grounds Being. 
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Though Heidegger continues to apply this term to his own work, his understanding of logos 
shifts alongside his appreciation of ancient Chinese philosophy to become more synonymous 
with a primary unifying movement of clearing or saying (Burik 2017 33-4).  
This processual appreciation of Being subverts the metaphysical desire to concretize entities 
within-the-world, which is a very common talking point in comparative literature on Heidegger 
and Daoism. Lin Ma, for example, refers to Heidegger’s “exacerbating worry about Ge-stell” as 
the reason he draws on Daoism to help enact another beginning of Western thinking (Ma 2006, 
166). She argues that Daoist texts represented the hope of redirecting the misguided historicality 
that Heidegger diagnosed in Western thought (Ma 2006, 166). Although she does not explore 
this wrong turn in terms of what I called the historical sense of errancy, Ma does discuss the 
implication that Heidegger’s Daoist references have on this errant historicality, and goes on to 
provide critically important resources for interpreting the accuracy of such references.  
In the course of her analysis, Ma breaks down each of Heidegger’s references to the dao and 
points out the comparative flaws in his interpretations. Her main conclusion is that the idea that 
dao could not genuinely serve as a leitword for Heidegger in the same sense that the German 
word Weg (way) does. As she puts it, “Only when interpreted in the particular manner, or 
thought in its proper nature as Heidegger may ascribe to it, can dao be said to refer to Weg. Weg 
is the standard against which dao is measured. This is because Weg is the primary and grounding 
word-thing in Heidegger’s thought” (Ma 2006, 150). Much of Ma’s criticism arises from the 
bluntness with which Heidegger applies these terms, such as when he interprets ‘nothingness’ 
(wu) in Daodejing chapter 11 as an abstract metaphysical notion of ‘non-existence’, rather than 
the simple not-being-present that it originally indicated (Ma 2006, 161-2). When I mentioned 
these sections above, I brought the same metaphysical notion to them, as my intent is to focus on 
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Heidegger’s interpretation of these passages. As such, I have no reason to disagree with Ma on 
these points, and I am heavily indebted to her for providing such thorough translations of Daoist 
and Heideggerian interplay, but I am also in favour of Edgar Lyra’s criticism of Ma’s project. He 
agrees that Heidegger’s application of Daoist work inevitably pushes Laozi and Zhuangzi into a 
foreign commentary on metaphysics, but he argues that our attitude toward this should be 
positive because Heidegger does this in order to move away from the “gravitational nucleus of 
metaphysics” that is so dominant in contemporary thought (Lyra 2014, 437-8). As he puts it, 
“Laozi … seemed to Heidegger to be particularly attentive to the ontological dignity of 
‘nonbeing’” and as such, Heidegger’s “interest in Daoism … can be seen as an inseparable part 
of his effort to reopen the question of Being” (Lyra 2014, 438). Bret Davis makes this even 
clearer when he notes that 
it is highly significant that Heidegger’s interest in the Daoist classics is rekindled 
precisely during his turn away from understanding the relation between human being 
and being in violent and voluntaristic terms, namely in terms of a militant bringing to 
stand of the overpowering onslaught of being, and his concomitant turn toward 
understanding this relation in terms of a non-willful releasement (Gelassenheit) to a 
letting-be (Seinlassen) (Davis 2020, 167) 
On this view, Daoist works are juxtaposed with Heidegger’s own in order to reveal a distinction 
between the onticizing tendencies of the willing human being, and an open region which, while 
still bearing some marks of the will, is responsive to the movement of way and the mystery of 
Being.  
But as we have seen, the world-moving ‘way’ is articulated both as an openness to a 
fundamental errancy, and as a saying which brings forth the essential totality of language that is 
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therein disclosed (May 2005, 37). It might be argued that if language is so central to Heidegger’s 
work, it prioritizes a bringing-forth of saying that does not highlight the null ground of errancy. 
But recent scholarship has pointed out that language features the same double movement into 
concealment and unconcealment that we see in errancy and the way. It is tacitly acknowledged in 
Heidegger’s work that language breaks off where the possibility of saying the world begins, and 
as such, language remains ‘grounded in silence’ (Davis 2020, 174). This could be partially due to 
the fact that the open region to which the movement of way belongs cannot be captured by 
representational understanding, as is attested to by the Guide in Country Path Conversations 
(Heidegger 2016, 73/G112). This inability is also reflected in Lao-Zhuang Daoist texts, such as 
the first verse of the Daodejing in which Laozi famously calls the dao mysterious and unnamable 
(Laozi 2001, 14). As such, it seems that even at the level of Logos and the ‘call’ of Being, 
Heidegger has surrounded the subject of our inquiry in an unarticulated region of errancy. This 
region, when allowed to serve its role in concealing, uncannily escapes representational 
understanding, but also gives light to the clearing of primary words like ‘Weg’. In my view, this 
conclusion is signaled quite clearly in Heidegger’s asides to Daoist texts, and the manifest 
undercurrent of errancy that it signals should be pointed out as explicitly as possible throughout 
Heidegger’s own project. 
7) Errancy in the Way as Lostness 
It is my belief that the term most emblematic of the twofold errancy in the way is ‘lostness.’ 
As we have seen already, the term ‘way’ does not implicitly carry this connotation. Our common 
use of ‘way’ harbours the assumption that the myriad ways of the world could each be ‘found’, 
or traced by ontic maps, despite Heidegger’s denial of this (Heidegger 1971a, 92). But in reality, 
these ways are fundamentally ‘lost’, and the further we move from the comforts of metaphysical 
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enframing, the more obvious this sense of lostness will become. This is literally manifested in 
Country Path Conversations (1944-5), where the encroaching darkness of night serves as an 
analogy for a departure from metaphysical thinking and the growing feeling of lostness that 
accompanies it. The characters come up against the realization that the true notion of way (in the 
sense of the movement of Being) is not fully articulable and escapes representational language. 
The way exceeds human understanding because it is neither solely a human movement in which 
we send ourselves along a path, nor is it a completely passive arising of the world that relies on 
Being alone. The truth is in the middle; the way arises out of the interchange between these two 
poles. As Massimiliano Lacertosa puts it, “we neither create a world ex nihilo (out of nothing) 
nor are we totally determined by it. Quite the reverse: we walk in the middle of these two 
extremes; we discover a place by making space for it in our conceptions” (Lacertosa 2019, 116). 
Our task is not to bend the unfolding of the world to our will, as we do in logocentric 
metaphysics, but to create the tranquil emptiness of letting-be wherein we might hear the call of 
Being. Like seeing a star slowly appear as the sun sets, we must embrace the gathering darkness 
of our own way-making in order to allow the light of Being, itself, to shine forth.  
As we saw earlier, the problem with errancy in the historical sense is that it effaces and 
forgets this possibility. It passes over the manner in which the open region arises, instead treating 
the way as something in which Being is set upon by the human will and enframed along concrete 
paths. In doing so, it is unable to cultivate a state of ‘releasement’ in which the human being 
listens and responds to the way-making of Being, therein opening themselves to the genuine 
possibility of finding a way into truth. But if this middle-voiced way-making is possible, it will 
still not be like a ‘right path’ that we have finally found. To imagine that such a path exists 
independently from the mutual way-making of the human being and Being itself would be to 
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fundamentally misunderstand the way. In reality, Heidegger’s way is one that is shot through 
with lostness. Human beings finds themselves on a path that arises out of a withdrawing, errant 
movement, and no alternative paths exist independently such that they could be found. Instead, 
the only solution to this problem is to cease our incessant ‘sending’ along various ways and 
reevaluate how ways arise in the first place. Heidegger calls us to realize the historical 
contingency and limited perspective of our contemporary mode of revealing; to see the multiple 
senses in which the way is errant, and in doing so, to release ourselves into a state where we can 
listen and respond to the way-making movement of Being itself. In other words, we must come 
face to face with the fundamental lostness of the way, and redefine what the active process of 
‘finding our way’ would even look like. 
One way Heidegger describes this new middle-voiced way-making is Eignis, or a “restful 
event of peaceful owning whereby one comes to a proper understanding of Being by letting 
oneself be owned by Being, and Being achieves the proper mode of disclosing by letting its 
voice be heard by one” (Ma and van Brakel 2014, 531). As Lacertosa says, any such new 
understanding of the unfolding way would be closer to a Daoist sense of ‘becoming’ than it 
would be to any foundational substance or traditional conception of Being (Lacertosa 2019, 116). 
If we could open ourselves to such an understanding, even those metaphysical notions of Being 
would reveal themselves to be nothing more than the errant runoff of the great hidden stream of 
Being. They would be, using my terminology, historical products of the errancy of the way. 
Overcoming these would not imply that the way was no longer fundamentally errant, but simply 
that our way-making is no longer dominated by an errant mode of revealing that ‘sets upon’ 
Being, but instead begins with an openness to the call of Being; a withdrawing in which the 
errancy and the unconcealment of the world can arise between the human being and Being itself.  
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8) Conclusion and Application 
Despite the fact that Heidegger directs his reader towards a new way of thinking that avoids 
the pitfalls of metaphysics and Platonic philosophy (Heidegger 1977c, 378), it is hotly debated to 
what extent human beings can really leave these errant ways behind. This debate begins with the 
German word Heidegger sometimes uses to signal the letting-go of these metaphysical paths; 
Verwindung, which has been translated as overcoming, surmounting, wrestling-with, surpassing, 
or even restoration (Mehta 1967, 438, 473). This term seems to indicate that, in some sense, 
philosophy must be overcome, or perhaps even abandoned, as Heidegger affirms that it has 
become entwined with metaphysical enframing (Rae 2013, 240). Philosophy has become so 
committed to the idea that Being is synonymous with presence that it fails to cultivate the proper 
openness to Being, instead prioritizing the concrete category of ‘actuality’ (Rae 2013, 245). But 
a debate has sprung up around the possibility of such a ‘meditative’ mode of thought.  
Because Heidegger is known to critique the act of willing as implicated in the larger 
problem of metaphysics (Heidegger 1975f, 117), it is confusing how one is supposed to enter 
into the state of releasement that might ‘overcome’ metaphysics. It seems that if meditative 
thinking relies on an act of the will to choose this mode of thought and enact the overturning of 
metaphysics, then meditative thinking remains contaminated by the same willing which gave rise 
to metaphysics in the first place (Rae 2013, 250). However, the alternative is that Heidegger’s 
‘releasement’ requires a complete absence of willing, and an arbitrary reliance on Being to bring 
about this new type of thought (Rae 2013, 251). This is further complicated by the fact that 
overcoming metaphysical thinking is not merely a process of openness, but also a process 
involving the realization of technological enframing itself. This realization is presumably also a 
process tied up in willing (Rae 2013, 252). Gavin Rae provides a third possibility, arguing that 
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Heidegger’s non-willing releasement is actually an active type of willing, but that its 
metaphysical implications fall away once meditative thinking is achieved (Rae 2013, 254). He 
argues for this by appealing to Heidegger’s concept of the ‘trace’ – a remnant of metaphysical 
thought that remains in the thinking that overcomes philosophy.  
Rae’s argument is that this reconstructed trace of willing will be important in the 
“transformative movement from metaphysical to meditative thinking,” but that after this 
transition, “all forms of willing will be extinguished from meditative thinking, thereby ensuring 
meditative thinking does not impose itself on being, but stands in the clearing of being to let 
being be to reveal ‘itself’ as it is” (Rae 2013, 254). This is one conclusion in a much broader 
body of literature, but I believe it relates nicely to my project because it retains the sense that 
letting-be is not solely passive or active. As we have seen, letting-be involves the rethinking of 
the passive/active schema. One could reframe the above concerns about willing as a worry that 
humanity’s prioritization of self-assertion, sending, or, perhaps even, ‘attempting-to-find’ the 
new way of thinking could not possibly give rise to an open releasement, as this releasement 
requires the ‘overcoming’ of such projects. But this would be to misunderstand Heidegger’s 
problem with metaphysics and technical enframing. As we saw earlier, technology is an essential 
mode of revealing that makes entities present in a certain light. Heidegger is not concerned by 
the fact that humans can ‘set upon’ Being in this way, as this is merely an aspect of the 
inalienable openness of our ontological errancy. Instead, Heidegger is concerned by the fact that 
today, technology and metaphysics have gained ontological priority over every form of thinking. 
In the context of my paper, the idea that a trace of this metaphysical past must be taken up in 
order to ‘overcome’ metaphysics is not in conflict with Heidegger’s work. The ‘overcoming’ that 
would result would not be a denial of errancy in either of its senses, as though arriving at the new 
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way of thinking would be like finding a new region in which the open space of errancy is no 
longer a factor. Such a region could not exist. Furthermore, to seek such a region out would only 
perpetuate the way of technical enframing, as you would be forgetting the essential openness of 
the unfolding of the way. In short, any willing required for Heidegger’s releasement is not a 
problem because it is a willing that is aware of the manner of its own arising. Willing is not a 
problem as long as it wills non-willing; as long as it withdraws in order to remain open to the call 
of Being, and then engages in way-making as a mutual response to this call. 
One question that this conclusion raises, which remains unanswered in Rae’s paper, is how 
this meditative thinking removes or neutralizes the human will and its metaphysical trace. I think 
that a proper attentiveness to the inherent ‘lostness’ of the movement of Being could also 
supplement this lack. If the reader sees the flow of Being as a fundamentally lost movement – 
one in which a correct path cannot be ‘found,’ and in which we are called instead to reexamine 
how the way arises – then it would not be unbelievable that the human will and its metaphysical 
trace would be extinguished in this way. A true open comportment to the clearing of Being 
would reveal the historical contingency of enframing, and as such, the extinguishment of 
enframing would entail a perspectival shift, rather than a full ontological shift barring the human 
from returning to this errant path, which seems impossible. In this way, the perspective of open 
comportment might see the human will like a spotlight in a dark field. Its lighting of objects 
would overpower the natural flow of unconcealment arising from Being itself, and instantiate an 
artificial spectre of lighting and concealing that is primarily concerned with appearances. This 
metaphysically motivated lighting would be intent to reveal the grounds of the beings it 
examines, but it would overlook the very interplay of revealing and concealing that it utilizes to 
examine them. To step outside of metaphysical thought and look at this scene from an open 
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perspective would be like watching a person shining a flashlight around a field at night, claiming 
that soon she would know everything about this world by looking at the objects that her light 
captures. From the perspective of meditative thinking, this would be comical, because even if she 
looks at every single object, she will still have completely missed the incorruptible darkness that 
follows her at every turn. Her preoccupation with the appearances that she finds will completely 
pass over the arising of the way itself; the interplay of concealment and unconcealment coming 
from both human way-making and the way-making of Being itself. In short, this metaphysician 
would be seeking to find a region, without realizing that it is lost at its core.  
This lostness is where I have arrived in my project to build a way into the way. Perhaps this 
seems like an impossible conclusion, as the way is all around us. As we saw earlier, Heidegger 
says that “All is way” (Heidegger 1971a, 92). If this is true, how could the arising of everything 
we encounter be fundamentally lost? In order to understand this conclusion, we must first 
understand that the manner in which we find the world is fundamentally errant. As long as the 
dominant manner of thinking prioritizes the human activity of enframing, then Being will remain 
unheard and our way-making will be dominated by errancy. On the one hand, this errancy is 
fundamental to the way, insofar as it ontologically represents the openness of Being. On the 
other hand, this open region has a historically contingent tendency to efface its own openness, 
forget the manner of its arising, and therein seek out truth along paths where it cannot be found. 
Since this situation calls for a reevaluation of the very project of ‘finding’ the way, and a new 
understanding of the arising of the way itself, it seems reasonable to say that a certain ‘lostness’ 
is fundamental to Heidegger’s way. In this sense, I believe that lostness brings out the twofold 
errancy in Heidegger’s work, and clarifies its place in his concept of the way, which is arguably 




Brakel, Jaap van. 2014. “Heidegger on Zhuangzi and Uselessness: Illustrating Preconditions of 
Comparative Philosophy.” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 41 (3/4): 387–406. 
Burik, Steven. 2010. “Thinking on The Edge: Heidegger, Derrida, and the Daoist Gateway (Men 
門).” Philosophy East and West 60 (4): 499–516. 
———. 2016. “Comparative Resources: Continental Philosophy and Daoism.” Journal of Daoist 
Studies 9 (9): 18–48.  
———. 2017. “Logos and Dao Revisited: A Non-Metaphysical Interpretation.” Philosophy East 
and West 68 (1): 23–41.  
———. 2019. “Darkness and Light: Absence and Presence in Heidegger, Derrida, and Daoism.” 
Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 18 (3): 347–370.  
Capobianco, Richard. 2014. Heidegger’s Way of Being. New Studies in Phenomenology and 
Hermeneutics. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 
Chai, David. 2014a. “Meontological Generativity: A Daoist Reading of the Thing.” Philosophy 
East and West 64 (2): 303–18. 
———. 2014b. “Nothingness and the Clearing: Heidegger, Daoism and the Quest for Primal 
Clarity.” The Review of Metaphysics 67 (3): 583–601. 
Cronin, Irena. 2013. “Inauthentic Dasein and Its Relation to a ‘Chinese-like “Constancy.”’” 
Balkan Journal of Philosophy V (1): 81–86. 
Davis, Bret W. 2016. “Translator’s Foreword.” In Country Path Conversations, by Martin 




———. 2016b. “Heidegger on the Way from Onto-Historical Ethnocentrism to East-West 
Dialogue.” Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual 6 (July): 130–56.  
———. 2019. “Knowing Limits: Toward a Versatile Perspectivism with Nietzsche, Heidegger, 
Zhuangzi and Zen.” Research in Phenomenology 49: 301–34. 
———. 2020. “Heidegger and Daoism: A Dialogue on the Useless Way of Unnecessary Being.” 
In Daoist Encounters with Phenomenology: Thinking Interculturally about Human 
Existence, edited by David Chai, 161–96. New York: Bloomsbury. 
Delaune, Tim. 2015. “The Tao of Heidegger.” Presented at the Western Political Science 
Association 2015 Annual Meeting, Chinese Thought in Comparative Political Perspective 
Panel, Las Vegas, April 3.  
Epicurus. 1940. “Letter to Menoeceus.” In The Stoic and Epicurean Philosophers: The Complete 
Extant Writings of Epicurus, Epictetus, Lucretius, Marcus Aurelius, edited by Whitney J. 
Oates, 30–33. New York: Random House. 
Griffiths, Dominic. 2017. “Martin Heidegger’s Principle of Identity: On Belonging and 
Ereignis.” South African Journal of Philosophy 36 (3): 326–36.  
Heidegger, Martin. 1962. Being and Time. Translated by John Macquarrie and Edward 
Robinson. San Francisco: Harper. 
———. 1971a. “The Nature of Language.” In On the Way to Language, translated by Peter D. 
Hertz, 57–110. New York: Harper & Row. 
———. 1971b. “The Way to Language.” In On the Way to Language, translated by Peter D. 
Hertz, 111–38. New York: Harper & Row. 
———. 1975a. “Building Dwelling Thinking.” In Poetry, Language, Thought, translated by 
Albert Hofstadter, 143–62. n.p.: Harper/Colophon. 
38 
 
———. 1975b. “Language.” In Poetry, Language, Thought, translated by Albert Hofstadter, 
187–210. n.p.: Harper/Colophon. 
———. 1975c. ...“...Poetically Man Dwells...” In Poetry, Language, Thought, translated by 
Albert Hofstadter, 211–29. n.p.: Harper/Colophon. 
———. 1975d. “The Origin of the Work of Art.” In Poetry, Language, Thought, translated by 
Albert Hofstadter, 15–88. n.p.: Harper/Colophon. 
———. 1975e. “The Thing.” In Poetry, Language, Thought, translated by Albert Hofstadter, 
163–86. n.p.: Harper/Colophon. 
———. 1975f. “What Are Poets For?” In Poetry, Language, Thought, translated by Albert 
Hofstadter, 89–142. n.p.: Harper/Colophon. 
———. 1977a. “Modern Science, Metaphysics, and Mathematics.” In Martin Heidegger: Basic 
Writings, edited by David Farrell Krell, 243–82. New York: Harper & Row. 
———. 1977b. “On the Essence of Truth.” In Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings, edited by 
David Farrell Krell, 113–42. New York: Harper & Row. 
———. 1977c. “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking.” In Martin Heidegger: Basic 
Writings, edited by David Farrell Krell, 369–92. New York: Harper & Row. 
———. 1977d. “The Question Concerning Technology.” In Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings, 
edited by David Farrell Krell, 283–318. New York: Harper & Row. 
———. 1977e. “What Calls for Thinking.” In Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings, edited by 
David Farrell Krell, 341–68. New York: Harper & Row. 
———. 1977f. “What Is Metaphysics.” In Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings, edited by David 
Farrell Krell, 91–112. New York: Harper & Row. 
39 
 
———. 2016. Country Path Conversations. Translated by Bret W. Davis. Studies in Continental 
Thought. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Hsiao, Paul Shih-yi. 1987. “Heidegger and Our Translation of the Tao Te Ching.” In Heidegger 
and Asian Thought, edited and translated by Graham Parkes, 93–104. Honolulu: University 
of Hawaii. 
Huntington, Patricia. 2020. “Heidegger and Zhuangzi: The Transformative Art of the 
Phenomenological Reduction.” In Daoist Encounters with Phenomenology: Thinking 
Interculturally about Human Existence, edited by David Chai, 197–218. New York: 
Bloomsbury. 
Jung, Hwa Yol. 1987. “Heidegger’s Way with Sinitic Thinking.” In Heidegger and Asian 
Thought, edited by Graham Parkes, 217–44. Honolulu: University of Hawaii. 
Lacertosa, Massimiliano. 2019. “Interpreting Dao (道) between ‘Way-Making’ and ‘Be-
Wëgen.’” In Ancient and Modern Practices of Citizenship in Asia and the West, edited by 
Gregory Bracken, 103–20. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. 
Laozi. 2001. Tao Te Ching: The Definitive Edition. Translated by Jonathan Star. New York: 
Tarcher/Penguin. 
Lewin, David. 2015. “Heidegger East and West: Philosophy as Educative Contemplation.” 
Journal of Philosophy of Education 49 (2): 221–39. 
Li, Ruohui. 2011. “On Laozi’s Dao—An Attempt to Make Philosophy Speak Chinese.” 
Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (1): 1–19. 
Lyra, Edgar. 2014. “Heidegger and the Common Destiny of the East and the West.” Journal of 
Chinese Philosophy 41 (3–4): 426–41. 
40 
 
Ma, Lin. 2006. “Deciphering Heidegger’s Connection with the Daodejing.” Asian Philosophy 16 
(3): 149–71.  
———. 2015. “Thinking with Zhuangzi and Su Shi Against Heidegger on Artwork.” Philosophy 
East & West 65 (4): 809–45.  
Ma, Lin, and Jaap van Brakel. 2014. “Out of the ‘Ge-Stell?’ The Role of the East in Heidegger’s 
‘Das Andere Denken.’” Philosophy East and West 64 (3): 527–62. 
May, Reinhard. 2005. “Dao: Way and Saying.” In Heidegger’s Hidden Sources: East-Asian 
Influences on His Work, 37–46. New York: Routledge.  
Mehta, J.L. 1967. Martin Heidegger: The Way and the Vision. Honolulu: University of Hawaii. 
Mugerauer, Robert. 2008. Heidegger and Homecoming: The Leitmotif in the Later Writings. 
Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 
Nelson, Eric S. 2004. “Responding to Heaven and Earth: Daoism, Heidegger, and Ecology.” 
Environmental Philosophy 1 (2): 66–75. 
———. 2014. “Technology and the Way: Buber, Heidegger, and Lao-Zhuang ‘Daoism.’” 
Journal of Chinese Philosophy 41 (3/4): 307–27.  
———. 2019. “Heidegger’s Daoist Turn.” Research in Phenomenology 49: 362–84.  
Parkes, Graham. 1987. “Thoughts on the Way: Being and Time via Lao-Chuang.” In Heidegger 
and Asian Thought, edited by Graham Parkes, 105–44. Honolulu: University of Hawaii. 
———. 2012. “Lao-Zhuang and Heidegger on Nature and Technology.” Journal of Chinese 
Philosophy 39 (December): 112–33.  
Pattison, George. 2000. Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to the Later Heidegger. Routledge 
Philosophy Guidebooks. London: Routledge.  
41 
 
Pöggeler, Otto. 1987. “West-East Dialogue: Heidegger and Lao-Tzu.” In Heidegger and Asian 
Thought, edited and translated by Graham Parkes, 47–78. Honolulu: University of Hawaii. 
Rae, Gavin. 2013. “Overcoming Philosophy: Heidegger, Metaphysics, and the Transformation to 
Thinking.” Human Studies 36 (2): 235–57. 
Stambaugh, Joan. 1987. “Heidegger, Taoism, and the Question of Metaphysics.” In Heidegger 
and Asian Thought, edited by Graham Parkes, 79–92. Honolulu: University of Hawaii. 
Taylor, Charles. 2007. “Heidegger on Language.” In A Companion to Heidegger, 433–55. John 
Wiley & Sons, Ltd.  
Xu, Keqian. 2010. “Chinese ‘Dao’ and Western ‘Truth’: A Comparative and Dynamic 
Perspective.” Asian Social Science 6 (12): 8. 
Zhang, Xianglong. 2009. “The Coming Time ‘Between’ Being and Daoist Emptiness: An 
Analysis of Heidegger’s Article Inquiring into the Uniqueness of the Poet via the Lao Zi.” 
Philosophy East and West 59 (1): 71–87.  
———. 2017. “Technology, Dao-Technē and Home: The Significances and Limits of 
Heidegger’s Critique of Modern Technology’s Essence.” Yearbook for Eastern and Western 
Philosophy 2017 (2): 372–92.  
Zhuangzi. 2007. The Book of Chuang Tzu. Translated by Martin Palmer and Elizabeth Breuilly. 
Toronto: Penguin. 
Zimmerman, Michael E. 1993. “Heidegger, Buddhism, and Deep Ecology.” In The Cambridge 
Companion to Heidegger, 240–69. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
